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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing movement in international law to recog-
nize and protect the rights of indigenous peoples.' This move-
' Although definitions of "indigenous peoples" vary, a 1986 report of U.N.
Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo is informative:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that de-
veloped on their territories, consider themselves distinct fron other sec-
tors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them.
They form at present non-dominant sectors of the society and are deter-
mined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their an-
cestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural pat-
terns, social institutions and legal systems.
Josd Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations, U.N. ESCOR, 1 3V Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 4, paras. 379-80, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4 (1995).
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ment is a history of exploitation and colonization of indigenous
peoples throughout the world and in response to the resulting
deprivation of basic fundamental rights suffered by them.2 The
indigenous peoples affected by colonization and exploitation are
many, and include, but are not limited to, such groups as the
indigenous peoples of Australia, the Indian, Inuit, Metis and
other indigenous peoples of Canada, the Maori in New Zealand,
the Yanomami and other indigenous peoples of Brazil and the
Amazon, the indigenous peoples of African nations such as the
Ogoni People of Nigeria and the Maasai of Kenya, and the Na-
tive Americans of the United States.3 The Native American in-
digenous peoples are also many, and include such distinct tribes
as the Navajo Nation in the southwestern United States, the
Cherokee and Seminole Nations in the southeast, the Sioux Na-
tion of the midwest, and the Yakima Nation of the northwest.
4
The movement of international indigenous rights in the
20th century has culminated in two declarations of change: the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
to the Commission on Human Rights5 and the American Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.6 These declarations
broke new ground in addressing indigenous rights including the
right to self-determination, the right to internal governance and
2 See generally Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples:
A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57
(1999) (reviewing the legacy of conquest in various arenas around the planet and
the status of indigenous peoples under domestic law).
3 See id.
4 "An Indian tribe constitutes a body of Indians of the same or similar race,
united in a community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a par-
ticular, though sometimes ill-defined, territory." 41 AM. JuR. 2D Indians § 3
(1995) (citing Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901)) (hereinafter Indi-
ans). "Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power to limit the right of self-gov-
ernment of an Indian nation, has indicated that certain statutory prerequisites
must exist before a group of Indians may be considered a tribe and thereby be
eligible for special status in the law, including the requirement that Indians in a
tribe must all live on the same reservation, and must have adopted an organiza-
tional plan or constitution." Id. (citing Sault Ste. Marie v. Andrus, 458 F. Supp.
465 (D.D.C. 1978)).
5 See Erica-Irene A. Daes, Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Popu-
lations on its Eleventh Session, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 45th Sess., Annex
1, Agenda Item 14, at 50-51, U.N Doc. E/CN.4 (1993), reprinted in 9 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 212 (1996) [hereinafter U.N. Draft Declaration).
6 See Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. 625 OEA/ser. L./V./II.95, doc. 7 rev. (1996) [hereinafter OAS
Draft Declaration].
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legal systems, and the right to sovereignty. 7 These declara-
tions, however, have not been fully adopted by the United Na-
tions and the Organization of American States.8 In fact, the
United States has not endorsed either, insisting that these dec-
larations infringe on national sovereignty and promote seces-
sion and disintegration.9
The United States' reluctance to endorse either of the indig-
enous rights declarations is not surprising in light of the gov-
ernment's continuing treatment of Native Americans. 10
Notwithstanding the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the
United States, there are signs of a trend that would at least
begin a process of change with respect to tribal sovereignty in
the United States." This slight indication of change has not,
however, been reflected in the Supreme Court, which has failed
to uphold tribal sovereignty in recent cases.' 2
7 See generally S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary
International Law, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 7 (1991).
8 See Gustavo Capdevila, Rights: Delegates Obstruct Work of U.N. Indigenous
Groups, INTER PRESS SERV., Aug. 4, 1999, available at 1999 WL 5949942 (reporting
that delegates from several governments employ tactics that prevent approval of
United Nations resolutions and declarations that concern indigenous peoples).
9 See Dean B. Suagee, Human Rights of Indigenous People: Will the United
States Rise to the Occasion? 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 365, 376 (1997).
1O See, e.g., FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES (1994) (provid-
ing a chronological account of two centuries of treaty making and the subsequent
history of the treaties); DAVID E. WILKENS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND
THE U.S. SuPREME COURT (1997) (providing a historical survey of U.S. Supreme
Court cases relating to tribal sovereignty).
11 See 25 U.S.C.A. § 450 (1999) (providing a congressional statement of find-
ings that the "prolonged Federal domination of Indian service programs has served
to retard rather than enhance the progress of Indian people and their communi-
ties"); see also Exec. Order No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (1998) (establishing
protocol for consultation and collaboration with Indian tribal governments in the
development of regulatory practices that affect their communities); and Memoran-
dum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951
(Apr. 29, 1994) (clarifying the "responsibility to ensure that the Federal Govern-
ment operates within a government-to-government relationship with federally rec-
ognized Native American tribes").
12 See generally Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Burlington N.
R. R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 522 U.S. 801 (1997); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,
526 U.S. 473 (1999). Collectively, these cases may represent a recent change in
Supreme Court policy. Before these cases were decided, at least one author be-
lieved that the Supreme Court, when compared to the Presidency and Congress,
had a better track record of acknowledging tribal sovereignty and upholding treaty
rights. See WILKENS, supra note 10, at xi.
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Part II-A of this comment will provide a background on
American Indian Law and discuss the legal relationship of
American Indians with the United States. Part II-B will pro-
vide a background on developments in international indigenous
rights and outline rights proposed in international indigenous
rights declarations. Part III will review recent Supreme Court
decisions affecting tribal sovereignty and compare them with
indigenous rights declarations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Legal Relationship Between the United States and
Native Americans
A cursory view of "Indian" law in the United States does
not leave one with the impression that Native American peoples
are (or ever have been) independent, sovereign nations with in-
ternational legal status.1 3 Instead, current law portrays Native
American nations as dependent political communities placed
under the care and control of the Federal Government and sub-
ject to a broad plenary power of Congress. 14
What then provides the foundation for a view that Native
Americans have been and should now be treated as indepen-
dent, sovereign nations? Even before Columbus arrived in the
Americas, Native Americans had organized democratic socie-
ties.'5 Subsequently, the English, French and Spanish settlers
established alliances with Native American nations in order to
expand their sphere of commerce and influence. 16 The Euro-
pean nations, however, were at odds with the colonists, who
were eager to take over Indian lands without negotiation or
13 See generally Indians, supra note 4, §§ 7-15.
14 See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (adopting the doctrine
that Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs). See also Philip P. Frickey,
Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MImN. L. REV. 31, 35 (1996) (providing an
overview of the Kagama case and criticizing the decision as an "embarrassment of
constitutional theory... logic . . . and humanity.")
15 See Larry Sager, Rediscovering America: Recognizing the Sovereignty of Na-
tive American Indian Nations, 76 U. DEW. MERCY L. REV. 745, 771 (1999).
16 See Steven Paul McSloy, Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty
in the 21st Century, 20 NYU REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 217, 229 (1993) (citing STE-
PHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL RESUR-
GENCE 11-50 (1988)).
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compensation.17 This tension is apparent in a 1763 Royal Proc-
lamation from England that held void treaties and land
purchases made by the colonies or individual settlers without
approval of the Crown.'
Some commentators assert that the American political sys-
tem was fashioned from a combination of Native American and
European political theories and is analogous to the Iroquois
Confederacy of the five Indian nations of the Mohawk, Seneca,
Cayuga, Onondaga, and Oneida clans. 19 In fact, even Benjamin
Franklin recognized the Iroquois Confederacy and commented
on its political unity.20 Thus, the foundation for viewing Native
Americans as independent sovereign nations begins with the
recognition that such native political sovereigns existed before
America was settled by Europeans; but it does not end there.
The Constitution provided Congress with the power to "reg-
ulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes."21 Some have argued that
as the Commerce Clause lists "Indian tribes" distinctly from
"foreign Nations," it is logical to conclude that Native American
tribes were never considered independent nations.22 Others
have argued, however, that Indians were distinctly enumerated
in order to make clear that the government's regulations and
treaties with Indian nations, and not the states, would be su-
preme. 23 The latter argument is substantiated by the fact that
the formal mode of conducting diplomatic relations with the In-
17 See McSloy, supra note 16, at 234 (citing Letter from George Washington to
James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN
POLICY (Francis P. Prucha ed., 2d ed. 1990)).
18 See id. at 235.
19 See Sager, supra note 15, at 787, n.164 (citing RoxANNE DUNBAR ORTIZ, IN-
DIANS OF THE AMERICAS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION 2 (1984)).
20 "It would be a very strange Thing, if Six Nations of Ignorant Savages
should be capable of forming a Scheme for such an Union... and yet that a like
Union should be impracticable for ten or a Dozen English Colonies. .. ." Sager,
supra note 15 at 770 ( quoting 3 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN 42 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., 1905)).
21 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
22 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (stating that the Chero-
kee were not a foreign state in the sense of the constitution).
23 See McSloy, supra note 16, at 235, n.132 (noting that the only debate re-
garding Indian nations during the framing of both the Articles of Confederation
and the Constitution concerned the division of power between the state and federal
governments).
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dian nations was treaty-making. 24 The treaties with Indian na-
tions were concluded in the same manner as treaties with
foreign nations and were recognized by the Supreme Court as
the supreme law of the land, superior to any state constitution
or law.25
In the early 19th Century, many treaties were made with
Indian nations, and many were ignored in order to feed the ap-
petite of an expansion-hungry nation.26 A good example is the
Treaty of 1868 with the Sioux Indians that "set apart for the
absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians"
the western Dakotas, eastern Montana and Wyoming.27 Within
just a few years of making the Treaty of 1868, the United States
Army was carrying out armed attacks against the Sioux, seizing
land, and herding them onto reservations. 28 In the end, despite
the fact that the Treaty of 1868 had never been canceled, the
United States seized the Black Hills of South Dakota from the
Sioux.29 Eventually, however, Congress recognized the irony in
making treaties with Indian nations while at the same time
breaking other treaties with them. As a result, in 1871, a rider
was attached to an appropriations bill stating that thereafter,
"[n]o Indian Nation or tribe within the territory of the United
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent
nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may con-
tract by treaty."30 This served as an explicit signal that Native
American nations would no longer be recognized as indepen-
dent nations by the United States government.
Prior to 1871, however, Congress and the Supreme Court
recognized Native American nations as independent nations,
24 See McSloy, supra note 16, at 236.
25 See id.
26 See McSloy, supra note 16, at 239, 240.
27 Treaty with The Sioux - Brule, Oglala, Miniconjou, Yanktonai, Hunkpapa,
Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arcs, And Santee - And Arapaho, Apr. 29,
1868, art. 2, 15 Stat 635, available at 1868 WL 5271, 1 (Trty.) [hereinafter Treaty
of 1868].
28 See Sager, supra note 15, at 775 (citing ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR., Now THAT
THE BUFFALo's GONE 47 (1984)).
29 See id. In fact, in 1980, the Supreme Court awarded the Sioux Nation
$17.1 million in damages for the illegal seizure of the Black Hills. See United
States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
30 McSloy, supra note 16, at 243 (citing Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1871,
§ 1, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1983)).
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the former by its treaties and the latter by its decisions. 3 1 For
example, in Worcester v. Georgia,3 2 the court addressed an act
passed by the Georgia legislature that purported to incorporate
certain Cherokee territory into the state and to extend Geor-
gia's laws over the incorporated territory. 33 In addition, this act
required non-Indian persons to have a license in order to live in
Cherokee territory.34 Chief Justice Marshall held that Geor-
gia's extension of laws over the Cherokee Nation was void as
"repugnant to the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United
States."35 Although Marshall did find some limitations to tribal
sovereignty, namely, that the tribes could not convey their land
to anyone other than the United States, and the tribes could not
make treaties with foreign nations, he also recognized that "In-
dian nations had always been considered as distinct, indepen-
dent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time im-
memorial ... "36 In addition, Marshall stated that the "consti-
tution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be
made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanc-
tioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and conse-
quently admits their rank among those powers who are capable
of making treaties."37 Marshall also noted that the United
States has applied treaties with Indians as it has applied them
with the other nations of the earth, and that "[tihey are applied
to all in the same sense."38 Despite the early support from the
Supreme Court, however, the Cherokee were eventually re-
moved from their lands and forced to flee across the Mississippi
along what has become known as the "Trail of Tears."39
31 See Curtis G. Berkey, International Law and Domestic Courts Enhancing
Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 65, 66 n.4 (1992)
(noting that the precise number of Indian treaties is not known, but estimates put
the number at over 800 prior to 1871).
32 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
33 See id. at 539.
34 See id.
35 Id. at 561.
36 Id. at 556-60.
37 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
38 Id. at 559-560.
39 See McSloy, supra note 16, at 239 (citing FRANcIs P. PRUCHA, AMERICAN
INDIAN POLICY IN THE FoRmATrvE YEARS 213-273 (1962)).
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As the United States was expanding west and Congress
was revoking the status of Native American tribes as indepen-
dent nations, the Supreme Court clung to the concept that In-
dian tribes were independent nations. 40 For example, in Ex
parte Crow Dog,41 a member of the Sioux nation murdered a
Sioux Chief on Sioux land.42 A district attorney for the Dakota
Territory arrested Crow Dog, and he was later found guilty and
sentenced to death.43 The Supreme Court overturned the judg-
ment on the grounds that the United States had no jurisdiction
over the internal affairs of the Sioux and that Crow Dog need
answer only to the laws of his nation. 44 In upholding the con-
cept of Indian sovereignty, the Supreme Court held true to pre-
vious decisions. It would not be long, however, before pressure
from Congress and American citizens eroded this judicial
foothold. 45
Just two years after Crow Dog, Congress passed the Major
Crimes Act, which allowed federal law to be applied to Indians
for certain crimes.46 The constitutionality of this Act was chal-
lenged shortly thereafter in United States v. Kagama.47 Unlike
Crow Dog, the Supreme Court held in Kagama that despite the
lack of constitutional authorization, "[t]he power of the general
government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now
weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protec-
tion."48 Thus, in just three years, without any apparent consti-
tutional basis, the Supreme Court went from upholding tribal
sovereignty to allowing complete congressional power over Na-
tive American Nations. This initial infringement on tribal sov-
ereignty subsequently developed into the plenary power that
Congress now holds over Native American nations.
49
Today, the law regards Native American tribes as domestic
dependent nations.50 The tribes possess only those aspects of
40 See McSloy, supra note 16, at 244.
41 Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
42 See id. at 557.
43 See id.
44 See id. at 572.
45 See McSloy, supra note 16, at 245.
46 See Act of Mar. 3, 1885, § 9, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
47 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
48 Id. at 384.
49 See generally Indians, supra note 4, at §§ 7-15.
50 See id. at §8 (citing Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919)).
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sovereignty that are neither withdrawn by treaty or statute nor
by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.5 1
Indian tribes do retain the attributes of sovereignty over both
their members and their territory.5 2 This tribal sovereignty,
however, is dependent upon and subordinate to the federal gov-
ernment.53 The tribes have the power, through their tribal
councils, to provide for the punishment of offenses by Indians on
the reservation, 54 to determine tribal membership, to regulate
domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of in-
heritance for members unless expressly limited by treaties or
congressional legislation.55
Supreme Court recognition of tribal court sovereignty is ex-
emplified by National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians.56 In National Farmers, a member of the Crow
Tribe was struck by a motorcycle in the parking lot of his ele-
mentary school. 57 A suit was filed in the Crow Tribal Court
against the School District that resulted in a default judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs.58 The School District and its insurer,
National Farmers Union Insurance Co., then filed a complaint
in Federal District Court seeking an injunction against execu-
tion of the Tribal Court judgment. 59 The District Court granted
a permanent injunction against any execution of the Tribal
Court judgment on the basis that the Crow Tribal Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the tort that was the basis of
the default judgment.60 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed, concluding that the jurisdiction of the District Court
51 See Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599 F.2d 1061 (1st Cir. 1979).
52 See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
53 See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134 (1980).
54 See Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (1956).
55 See Indians, supra note 4, at §11 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544 (1981)).
56 National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845
(1985).
57 See id. at 847. The injured person was a minor returning from a school
activity. See id. The school was located on land owned by the State within the
boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation. See id.
58 Id. at 847. Although process was served on the Chairman of the School
Board, he failed to notify anyone and as a result, default judgment was entered
against the School District. See id.
59 See id. at 848.
60 See id. at 849.
9
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could not be supported on any constitutional, statutory, or com-
mon-law ground.61
In National Farmers, the main issue before the Supreme
Court was the extent to which Indian tribes have retained the
power to regulate the affairs of non-Indians. 62 The Court ruled
that "the existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will
require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent
to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or dimin-
ished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive
Branch policy . . . and administrative or judicial decisions."63
The Court determined, however, that the examination of such
sovereignty "should be conducted in the first instance in the Tri-
bal Court itself."64 Noting that Congress is committed to a pol-
icy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination,
the Court found that such a policy would be supported by a rule
that allows the tribal court the first opportunity to evaluate the
factual and legal bases of a challenge against jurisdiction.6 5
Thus, the Court concluded, "[ulntil petitioners have exhausted
the remedies available to them in the Tribal Court system, it
would be premature for a federal court to consider any relief."66
The policy of tribal sovereignty embodied in the tribal-ex-
haustion rule of National Farmers was subsequently challenged
in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante.67 In Iowa Mutual
Insurance, a member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe filed a com-
plaint in Blackfeet Tribal Court for injuries sustained in a ve-
hicular accident.68 Prior to any Tribal Court ruling on
jurisdiction, petitioners brought an action in Federal District
Court based on diversity of citizenship, requesting a declaration
that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the insured.69 The
61 National Farmers Union Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 849.
62 See id. at 848.
63 Id. at 855-56.
64 Id. at 856.
65 See id.
66 National Farmers Union Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 857.
67 Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
68 See id. at 11. The plaintiff was employed by the Wellman Ranch Company,
a Montana corporation insured by Iowa Mutual Insurance Company. See id.
While driving a cattle truck owned by the Wellman Ranch Company within the
boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation, plaintiff lost control of the vehicle and
was injured when the truck "jackknifed." Id.
69 See id. at 12-13.
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District Court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 70
In Iowa Mutual Insurance, the issue before the Supreme
Court was whether the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction
supplanted the federal policy of deference to tribal courts. 71
The Court first noted that "tribal authority over the activities of
non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal
sovereignty." 72 The Court also noted that "[clivil jurisdiction
over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts un-
less affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or fed-
eral statute."73 Reiterating the long-standing policy promoting
tribal self-government and self-determination, the Court ruled
that the tribal-exhaustion rule announced in National Farmers
applies to cases based on diversity of citizenship as well.7 4
Thus, the Court concluded, regardless of the basis of federal ju-
risdiction, "the federal policy supporting tribal self-government
directs a federal court to stay its hand in order to give the tribal
courts a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction."75
The policy of tribal sovereignty embodied in the tribal-ex-
haustion rule of National Farmers and reiterated in Iowa Mu-
tual Insurance Co. gives tribal courts the opportunity to
interpret laws that affect their members and to explain why
some decisions of the federal courts are wrongly decided from
the tribal court's understanding of its own law. 76 In recent deci-
sions, however, the Supreme Court has not sustained even this
limited reservation of sovereignty. 77 Rather, as discussed in
Part III, the Supreme Court has charted a course which is
"neither constitutionally authorized nor constitutionally lim-
70 See id. at 13.
71 See id. at 17.
72 Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 18 (citing Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 (1981)).
73 Id.
74 See id. at 16.
75 Id.
76 See Frank Pommersheim, Coyote Paradox: Some Indian Law Reflections
from the Edge of the Prairie, 31 Amiz. ST. L. J. 439, 459 (1999).
77 See generally Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Burlington N.
R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 522 U.S. 801 (1997); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,
526 U.S. 473 (1999).
11
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ited;"7 8 a course which is even less legitimate in light of the
growing international movement respecting indigenous rights.
B. Development of International Indigenous Rights
The concept of international indigenous rights began form-
ing in the post World War II era as a result of horrors born from
the Nazi regime, which prompted a rethinking of the unlimited
discretion states had regarding the treatment of their own citi-
zens. 79 Although not specifically related to indigenous peoples,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enacted in 1948
was the first such declaration to recognize human rights and
self-determination for peoples separate from states.8 0 These
rights were subsequently codified as legally binding agreements
in the 1966 United Nations Covenants. 8' International indige-
nous rights have subsequently been addressed by the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO),8 2 the United Nations,8 3 and
the Organization of American States (OAS).8 4
The ILO has adopted conventions on a variety of subjects
including freedom of association, the right to organize, collec-
tive bargaining, abolition of forced labor, and discrimination in
employment.8 5 The only international convention that relates
specifically to the rights of indigenous peoples is the ILO Con-
vention No. 169.86 This Convention acknowledges that "the
state of indigenous populations has significantly changed since
1957" and that "indigenous peoples exercise control over their
own institutions, ways of life ... economic development and...
maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions
78 See Pommersheim, supra note 76, at 462.
79 See Wiessner, supra note 2, at 98.
80 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., 67th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
81 See Wiessner, supra note 2, at 98 (citing International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 3,
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360).
82 See ILO Convention No. 169, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tri-
bal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, International Labour Con-
ference, available at 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169].
83 See generally U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5.
84 See generally OAS Draft Declaration, supra note 6.
85 See Suagee, supra note 9, at 367.
86 See id. (citing ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 82).
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.... .- 7 As of late 1997, the Convention had been ratified by ten
countries, including Norway, Mexico, Bolivia, Columbia, Costa
Rica, Denmark, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and Peru.88
This convention, however, has been criticized by indigenous
groups for failing to recognize the right of self-determination.8 9
The United Nations first addressed the issue of indigenous
rights in 1971 by creating the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, which was to study
the problem of discrimination against indigenous peoples. 90 In
1982, the United Nations Economic and Social Council, the par-
ent body of the human rights organs, established the Working
Group on Indigenous Populations (Working Group). 91 The
Working Group was charged with the task of reviewing develop-
ments affecting indigenous peoples and drawing up a draft dec-
laration on the rights of indigenous peoples for consideration by
the UN General Assembly.92
The Working Group subsequently engaged states, indige-
nous peoples and others in an extended multilateral dialogue on
indigenous rights.93 The Working Group has provided a forum
for indigenous representatives and government representatives
to express their concerns and assert their rights.9 4 Indeed, vir-
tually every State in the Americas has participated in the dis-
cussions of the Working Group.95 In 1993, after many years of
discussion, the Working Group finally agreed on a draft Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 96 In August 1994,
the Sub-Commission approved the Draft and passed it on to the
87 See Suagee, supra note 9, at 128 n.300, 368 (quoting ILO Convention No.
169, supra note 82, at 1384).
88 See Wiessner, supra note 2, at 100 (citing Lee Swepston, The ILO Indige-
nous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169): Eight Years After Adoption, in
HUMAN RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 17, 32-34 (Cynthia Price Cohen ed., 1998)).
89 See Suagee, supra note 9, at 368, 390 n.15 (citing International Indian
Treaty Council Position, OAS, IACHR, Draft of the Inter-American Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, http://www.hawaii-nation.org/iitc/oas-
position.html).
90 See id. at 368, 390 n.16 (citing The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Fact Sheet
No. 9, at 5-6 (1971)).
91 See id. at 369.
92 See id. at 370.
93 See Anaya, supra note 7, at 10.
94 See id. at 10, 11.
95 See id. at 11.
96 See generally U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5.
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Human Rights Commission for consideration. 97 In 1995, the
Human Rights Commission established its own Working Group
(HRCWG) and set up procedures by which indigenous organiza-
tions could apply for participation at the Working Group's meet-
ings.98 Although the HRCWG has continued discussions on the
adoption of the Declaration, 99 only two articles have been ap-
proved over the five years of deliberations.10 0
The U.N. Draft Declaration addresses such issues as
human rights, self-determination, territorial and resource
rights, economic activities, cultural and spiritual integrity, cul-
tural genocide, environment, health, education, and treaty en-
forcement. 1 1 The purpose and philosophy of the Declaration
are defined in the Preamble, which recognizes that "indigenous
peoples have been deprived of their human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, resulting, inter alia, in their colonization and
dispossession of their lands.., thus preventing them from exer-
cising, in particular, their right to development in accordance
with their own needs and interests."10 2 The Preamble also rec-
ognizes that "indigenous peoples have the right freely to deter-
mine their relationships with States in a spirit of coexistence,
mutual benefit and full respect ... [cionsidering that treaties,
agreements and other arrangements between States and indig-
enous peoples are properly matters of international concern and
responsibility."'10 3
One of the most controversial articles of the Declaration is
Article 3, which states that "indigenous peoples have the right
of self-determination [and] by virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their eco-
97 See Suagee, supra note 9, at 370.
98 See id. at 371 (citing Res. 1995/32, Commission on Human Rights, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1996/84 (1996)).
99 See U.N. Rights: U.N. Still at Odds Over Indigenous Rights, INTER PRESS
SERV., Dec. 14, 1998, available at 1998 WL 19901971 (describing the November 30
to December llth session of 1998, which ended without the approval of a single
clause of the 45-point draft Declaration, despite overwhelming endorsement of the
draft by indigenous groups).
100 See Gustavo Capdevila, Rights: Delegates Obstruct Work of U.N. Indigenous
Groups, INTER PRESS SERV., Aug. 4, 1999, available at 1999 WL 5949942.
101 See U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5.
102 U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5, at Preamble.
103 Id.
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nomic, social and cultural development."1 0 4 The controversy, at
least regarding the United States, is that the U.N. draft seems
to recognize collective or group rights in addition to individual
rights. The United States has taken the position that charac-
terizing a right as belonging to a community, or collective,
rather than an individual, can be and often is construed to limit
the exercise of that right and, thus, may open the door to the
denial of the right to the individual. 10 5
The U.N. Draft Declaration contains specific statements re-
garding the right of indigenous peoples to enjoy legal and judi-
cial independence from the State. First, the Preamble notes
that "treaties, agreements and other arrangements between
States and indigenous peoples are properly matters of interna-
tional concern and responsibility."1 0 6 The Draft Declaration
also states that "[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to maintain
and strengthen their distinct political, economic, social and cul-
tural characteristics, as well as their legal systems ...."17 In
addition, the Draft Declaration states that indigenous peoples
have the right "to maintain and develop their own indigenous
decision-making institutions." 08 These statements reflect the
desire of indigenous groups to have independent legal systems,
which are free from State usurpation and interference.
The Organization of American States (OAS) began develop-
ing their draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples in
November 1989 by recommending that the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) prepare an instrument
to protect such rights. 0 9 In September 1995, the first draft of
this instrument was sent to governments, interested organiza-
tions, experts and other entities for comments." 0 The IACHR
approved the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of
104 Id. at art. 3.
105 Suagee, supra note 9, at 377 (quoting U.S. Dep't of State, United States
Preliminary Statements: Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples (Nov. 1995)) [hereinafter U.S. Preliminary Statements].
106 U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5, at Preamble.
107 Id. at art. 4.
108 Id. at art. 19.
109 See Suagee, supra note 9, at 372 (citing Inter-Am. C.H.R., 245-50, OEA/
ser.LJVI.76, doc. 10 (1989)) [hereinafter Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1989].
110 See Wiessner, supra note 2, at 104-105 (citing Osvaldo Kreimer, The Begin-
nings of the Inter-American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 9 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 271, 272-73 (1996)).
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Indigenous Peoples at its ninety-fifth regular session and sub-
mitted it to the General Assembly and to its Permanent Coun-
cil."' Although the Declaration was expected to be approved by
the member countries at the 1998 General Assembly in com-
memoration of the OAS fiftieth anniversary, 1 2 this did not hap-
pen. In its last meeting, however, the General Assembly
resolved to renew the mandate of the Working Group so that it
may continue to consider the Proposed Declaration.
1 3
The Preamble of the OAS Draft Declaration recognizes "the
deprivation afflicting indigenous peoples ... the need to develop
national juridical systems to consolidate the pluricultural na-
ture of our societies... [and] the responsibility of all states and
peoples of the Americas to end racism."" 4 The OAS Draft Dec-
laration consists of twenty-seven articles addressing, in detail,
such things as human rights, legal systems, discrimination, cul-
tural integrity, education, religious freedom, health, environ-
mental protection, political rights, self-government, property
rights and implementation of the Draft Declaration. 1 5 The
OAS Draft Declaration expressly promotes internal self-govern-
ment, the formulation and application of indigenous law, and
self-identification." 6 Separatism and secession, however, are
expressly rejected. 1 7 Although the OAS Draft Declaration is
conservative in that it excludes the option of secession, it never-
theless places a high value on individual choice and relies more
on the remedy of empowerment and self-help than on govern-
mental action to remove the plight of the indigenous peoples." 8
Overall, the OAS Draft Declaration reflects a growing consen-
sus on the minimum threshold of legally enforceable claims of
indigenous communities and "is a major step toward a more ef-
fective system of protection of indigenous rights not only in the
Western Hemisphere, but beyond."" 9
111 See id. at 105 (citing OAS Draft Declaration, supra note 6).
112 See id. at 105.
113 See OAS G.A. Res. 1708, 3 0th Reg. Sess., 1' Plen. Sess., (XXX-O/00) (2000),
available at http:.//www.oas.org/.
114 OAS Draft Declaration, supra note 6, at Preamble.
115 See id.
116 See id. at arts. 15-6.
117 See id. at art. 25.
118 See Wiessner, supra note 2, at 107.
119 Id.
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Like the U.N. Draft Declaration, the OAS Draft Declara-
tion also has specific statements regarding the right of indige-
nous peoples to have legal and judicial independence from the
State. For example, Article 4 of the Declaration states that
"[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to have their legal person-
ality fully recognized by the states within their system." 120 In
addition, Article 16 of the Declaration reiterates that
"[i] ndigenous law shall be recognized as a part of the states' le-
gal system" and "[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to main-
tain and reinforce their indigenous legal systems and also to
apply them to matters within their communities .... ,,121 These
statements make it clear that indigenous peoples desire the
States to respect and refrain from interfering with the indige-
nous legal system and its application to persons within its
boundaries.
While full acceptance and adoption of the various interna-
tional indigenous rights declarations have yet to be realized,
these declarations reflect a growing stand against injustice and
possibly, a collective cry for help.122 For centuries, indigenous
peoples around the world have been persecuted, ignored, and
assimilated.123 Today, however, indigenous groups are fighting
back with these declarations and pressuring national govern-
ments to recognize them.124 Although it is just the beginning,
"[r]ecognition is the first stage of the path to conciliation." 125
III. APPOSITION OF RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
ON TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIGENOUS
RIGHTS DECLARATIONS
The policy and laws of the United States relating to tribal
sovereignty and specifically, the tribal-exhaustion rule embod-
ied in National Farmers126 and Iowa Mutual,127 appear to har-
120 OAS Draft Declaration, supra note 6, at art. 4.
121 Id. at art. 16.
122 See generally Rhona K.M. Smith, The International Impact of Creative
Problem Solving. Resolving the Plight of Indigenous Peoples, 34 CAL. W. L. REV.
411 (1998).
123 See id. at 419.
124 See id.
125 Id. at 423.
126 National Farmers Union Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 845.
127 Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 9.
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monize well with the declarations of indigenous peoples
regarding the right to enjoy independent legal systems.128 New
developments regarding Indian law in the United States, how-
ever, reflect "a new, almost vicious, historical amnesia and doc-
trinal incoherence. " 129 Although no judicial policy or doctrine
can justify a dismantling of Native American sovereignty and
independence, this trend is even less justifiable in light of the
development and declarations of international indigenous
rights law.
The erosion of tribal sovereignty and the tribal-exhaustion
rule began with Strate v. A-1 Contractors.130 In Strate, vehicles
driven by petitioner Frederick and respondent Stockert collided
on a portion of a North Dakota state highway that runs through
the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.131 The truck driven by
Stockert belonged to his employer, respondent A-1 Contractors,
a non-Indian owned enterprise with its principal place of busi-
ness outside of the reservation. 132 Fredericks filed a personal
injury action in Tribal Court against Stockert and A-1 Contrac-
tors, and Fredericks' adult children filed a loss-of-consortium
claim in the same lawsuit. 133 The Tribal Court ruled that it had
jurisdiction over Fredericks' claim and therefore denied respon-
dents' motion to dismiss. 34 The Northern Plains Intertribal
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.' 35
A-1 Contractors commenced an action in Federal District
Court seeking a declaratory judgment that, as a matter of fed-
eral law, the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate. The
complaint also sought an injunction against further Tribal
128 But see B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity:
Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 500 (1998) (noting that the tribal court exhaustion rule is a
good news, bad news scenario, representing an opportunity for tribal courts to ini-
tially resolve disputes but giving ultimate power to federal courts to review the
tribal court decisions).
129 Pommersheim, supra note 76, at 439.
130 Strate, 520 U.S. at 438.
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See id. Neither Stockert nor Fredericks were Indians or members of the
Tribal Court. See id. Fredericks, however, was the widow of a deceased tribal
member and had five adult children who are also members. See id.
134 Strate, 520 U.S. at 438..
135 See id.
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Court proceedings. 136 The District Court dismissed the action
upon finding that the Tribal Court did have civil jurisdiction
over Fredericks' complaint. 137 On appeal, a divided panel of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.1 38 The Eighth Cir-
cuit granted rehearing en banc and, in an 8-4 decision, reversed
the District Court's judgment.139 The en banc Court concluded
that under Montana v. United States,140 the Tribal Court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute.14'
In Strate, the Supreme Court boiled the issue down to one
question: "When an accident occurs on a portion of a public
highway maintained by the State under a federally granted
right-of-way over Indian reservation land, may tribal courts en-
tertain a civil action against an allegedly negligent driver and
the driver's employer, neither of whom is a member of the
tribe?"' 42 First, relying heavily on Montana v. United States, 4 3
136 See id.
137 See id. at 444. The District Court relied particularly on the decisions of
National Farmers and Iowa Mutual for precedent to dismiss the case.
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
141 Strate, 520 U.S. at 445. Note that in Montana, the Court was concerned
with the authority of the Crow Tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indi-
ans on lands within the Tribe's reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians.
See Montana, 450 U.S. at 544. The underlying issue in that case was whether the
Crow Tribe or Montana retained control over the bed of the Bighorn River. See id.
at 550-551. In denying the Crow Tribe the authority to regulate fishing on the
Bighorn River, the Court first had to determine that despite the First Treaty of
Fort Laramie and the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie, which explicitly "set apart
[land] for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the Crow Tribe, the
United States retained ownership of the riverbed as public land, which then
passed to the State of Montana when it joined the Union. Id. at 548, 551. After
ignoring the language of the Treaties and the intent of the U.S. Government to
recognize Crow ownership of the land, including the Bighorn River, the Court went
on to reiterate the general principal that except for a few exceptions, "the inherent
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers
of the tribe." Id. at 565. The Court also noted, however, that there are two situa-
tions in which a Tribe may retain civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reser-
vations, even on non-Indian fee land: (1) A Tribe may regulate the activities of non-
members who enter consensual relationships with the Tribe through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases or other arrangements; and (2) A tribe may also retain
civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation
when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. See id. at 565-566. Accord-
ing to the Court, no such circumstances were involved in the case at hand. See id.
at 566.
142 Strate, 520 U.S. at 442.
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the Court described a general rule that, absent specific congres-
sional direction, Indian tribes lack civil authority over the con-
duct of non-members on non-Indian land within a reservation.
This rule was stated to be subject to two exceptions: "The first
exception relates to nonmembers who enter consensual rela-
tionships with the tribe or its members; the second concerns ac-
tivity that directly affects the tribe's political integrity,
economic security, health, or welfare." 144
Thus, despite the petitioners contention that National
Farmers and Iowa Mutual were the guiding precedents, the
Court reiterated that those cases enunciate only a "prudential
rule" and thus, "do not expand or stand apart from Montana's
instruction on [Indian tribes' civil authority over non-mem-
bers]." 145 In reaching this outcome, the Court determined that
even though Montana involved the issue of regulatory authority
and control, its principles applied to adjudicative jurisdiction as
well. 146 The Court ruled that civil authority of Indian tribes
and their courts with respect to non-Indian fee lands generally
"does not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe...
subject to controlling provisions in treaties and statutes, and
the two exceptions identified in Montana."147 The Court con-
cluded that neither exception in Montana applied to the case at
hand. 48 More specifically, with respect to the second exception,
the Court found that if it required no more than an interest in
the safety of tribal members on a highway, then the exception
would severely shrink the rule. 149
143 Montana, 450 U.S. 544; see also accompanying description in note 141
supra.
144 Strate, 520 U.S. at 442.
145 Id. at 453.
146 See id.
147 Id. The Court also considered Petitioners argument that Montana did not
control because even though the highway was maintained by the State under a
federally granted right-of-way, the highway ran across Indian reservation land
which was held in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation. See id. at 454. The Court determined that the right-of-way which
was acquired by North Dakota rendered the highway, "for nonmember governance
purposes," as non-Indian land. Id.
148 See id. at 458.
149 See id. The idea that a Tribe's interest in the safety of their members on a
highway does not fall under Montana's second exception was subsequently applied
to railroad crossings. In Burlington N. R.R. Co. v.Red Wolf, 106 F.3d 868 (9th Cir.
1997), two members of the Crow Tribe were killed when a train collided with their
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Even when actions on tribal land appear to substantially
affect the health and welfare of Native Americans, tribal sover-
eignty and the tribal exhaustion rule have not been applied by
the Supreme Court. 150 In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Nezt-
sosie,15 ' members of the Navajo Nation filed two separate ac-
tions based on Navajo common law in the Navajo Tribal Court
against corporations that conducted uranium mining operations
on the Navajo Nation Reservation. 52 The first action involved
a suit by Arlinda and Laura Neztsosie against Rare Metals
Corp. of America, a defunct subsidiary of El Paso Natural Gas
Co., alleging personal injury arising from Rare Metal's uranium
mining activities. 153 The second action involved a suit by Zonnie
Marie Dandy Richards against Cyprus Foote Mineral Company,
successor to Vanadium Corporation of America, alleging per-
sonal injury and wrongful death arising from VCA's operation
of a uranium mine and concentrator which produced a uranium
mine tailings pile on land adjacent to the mine site.154 In both
cases, the defendants subsequently filed suit against the plain-
tiffs in Federal District Court, seeking a preliminary injunction
enjoining the plaintiffs from prosecuting their claims in Navajo
Tribal Court and seeking a declaration that the Navajo Tribal
Court had no jurisdiction over the claims. 155 In both cases, the
automobile at a railroad grade crossing south of Lodge Grass, Montana. See id. at
869. The Estates sued in tribal court and obtained a $250,000,000 judgment
against Burlington Northern. See id. Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in light
of Strate, vacated and remanded the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decision that the
district court could not enjoin tribal court proceedings before tribal remedies had
been exhausted. See id. at 871.
150 See El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 473.
151 See id.
152 See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 136 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 1998).
153 See id. at 613.
154 See id.
155 See id. Defendants argued that the Price Anderson Act and its legislative
history mandated exclusive federal court jurisdiction for claims arising from nu-
clear incidents. The Price-Anderson Act, enacted in 1957, amended the Atomic
Energy Act by adding 42 U.S.C. § 2210, as well as associated definitions in 42
U.S.C. § 2014. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957). In 1966, Congress added a
new subsection, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n), which provided that a "public liability action"
arising out of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence was within the original jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts and, if pending in any State court, might be removed for
consolidation in a single district court. Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891 at 892. See
also El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 473, Respondent's Brief, available at
1999 WL 14509 [hereinafter Respondent's Brief]. Plaintiffs argued that since the
Defendants did not have an indemnification agreement with the government, their
20001
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District Court denied in part, and granted in part, the defend-
ants' request for a preliminary injunction.156 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed each of the District
Court decisions declining to enjoin the plaintiffs from pursuing
non-Price Anderson Act claims, as well as the decisions to allow
the Tribal Courts to decide in the first instance whether the
plaintiffs' claims fell within the Price Anderson Act.157 In addi-
tion, the Court of Appeals sua sponte addressed and reversed
the District Court's partial injunctions, ruling that the Price
Anderson Act contained no express jurisdictional prohibition,
which would bar the tribal court from determining its jurisdic-
tion over Price Anderson Act claims.' 58 The United States Su-
preme Court subsequently granted certiorari, vacated the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded with instruc-
tions to remand the case to the District Court.159
The main issue addressed by the Supreme Court was
whether the doctrine of tribal court exhaustion "should apply in
this case, which if brought in a state court would be subject to
removal." 60 The Court found that the Price Anderson Act gives
federal courts original jurisdiction over any public liability ac-
tion arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident and pro-
vides for removal to a federal court if a Price Anderson action is
brought in a state court. 61 The Court then pondered the pur-
claims did not arise under the Price-Anderson Act. See Respondent's Brief at *24.
In addition, Plaintiffs argued that the removal provision added to the Price-An-
derson Act applied only where the original case was in State court and there was
nothing in the Act to indicate that Congress intended that term to cover tribal
courts. See id. at *27.
156 See El Paso Natural Gas, 136 F.3d at 613. The District Court denied El
Paso's request for a preliminary injunction "to the extent that it in any way seeks
to have this Court rule on any aspect of jurisdiction of the Navajo tribal court...
except to the extent that [the Plaintiffs] seek relief based upon the Price-Anderson
Act in tribal court." Id. The consequences of those injunctions "were left in the air,
however, since the District Court declined to decide whether the Act applied to the
claims brought by the Neztsosies and Richards, leaving those determinations to
the Tribal Courts in the first instance." El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526
U.S. 473, 478 (1999). 119 S. Ct. 1430, 1434
157 See El Paso Natural Gas Co., 136 F.3d 610.
158 See id. at 615. The Court addressed this issue sua sponte because neither
the Neztsosies nor Richards had appealed the partial injunctions, which would
have prohibited the Tribal Court from hearing Price Anderson Act claims. See id.
159 See El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 488.
160 Id. at 476.
161 See id. at 484.
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pose and goals of the Price Anderson Act and stated that it
could not "think of any reason that Congress would have fa-
vored tribal exhaustion."162 When faced with the language of
the specific provision of the Price Anderson Act allowing re-
moval from state courts only, the Court determined that Con-
gress' failure to provide for tribal-court removal must have been
inadvertent. 163 The Court justified this determination by not-
ing that "Congress probably would never have expected an occa-
sion for asserting tribal jurisdiction over claims like these."164
In conclusion, the Court ruled that instead of applying the tri-
bal exhaustion rule, "the District Court should have decided
whether respondents' claims constituted 'public liability actions'
arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident."165
The decisions in Strate v. A-1 Contractors and El Paso Nat-
ural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie represent at the very least, an in-
fringement upon tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction. 166 Navajo
Nation Council Speaker Edward T. Begay, for example, de-
scribed the Neztsosie decision as "another infringement upon
the sovereignty of the Navajo Nation."167 Similarly, Earl Tulley,
Vice President of Din Citizens Against Ruining the Environ-
ment, termed the Neztsosie decision "a classic example of judi-
cial and corporate racism and arrogance. 1 68 Council Speaker
Begay further stated that "if this trend continues, there will be
so much diminishment of tribal authorities that tribal courts
are going to be rendered ineffective." 169 Irrespective of their ef-
fect on existing law, however, these decisions do not harmonize
well with rights recently declared by indigenous groups. 170
The U.N. Draft Declaration specifically states that
"[iindigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen
162 Id. at 485.
163 See id. at 487.
164 El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 487.
165 Id. at 488.
166 See Pommersheim, supra note 76, at 463. See also Brenda Norrell, Su-
preme Court Rules on Court Venue for Uranium Mining Cases in Indian Country,
INDIAN CouNTRY TODAY, May 10, 1999, available at 1999 WL 17338561.
167 See Norrell, supra note 166.
168 Id.
169 Id. (quoting Navajo Nation Speaker Edward T. Begay) quoting Navajo Na-
tion Speaker Edward T. Begay.
170 See U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5; OAS Draft Declaration, supra
note 6.
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their distinct political, economic, social and cultural character-
istics, as well as their legal systems .... "171 The OAS Draft
Declaration more specifically states that "indigenous peoples
have the right to maintain and reinforce their indigenous legal
systems and also to apply them to matters within their commu-
nities .... "-172 While the importance of an independent indige-
nous legal system, or tribal sovereignty, is not obvious to
everyone, 173 indigenous peoples of the world are nevertheless
"[cionvinced that control [by them] over developments affecting
them and their lands, territories and resources will enable them
to maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures and tra-
ditions .... ,,174 Indigenous peoples of the United States are no
different.175 Independent legal systems are important to indig-
enous peoples, including Native Americans because their cul-
ture, way of life, and control and ownership of land is unique
and "does not necessarily coincide with the systems protected
by the domestic laws of the states in which they live."176 Thus,
the importance of sovereignty is that it bestows legitimacy on
the exercise of the indigenous political unit. 177
In many tribal communities, dual justice systems exist.178
One is based on an American paradigm of justice, with its roots
in European law, and the other is based on an indigenous para-
digm. 179 In the American paradigm, a hostile, adversarial sys-
tem declares winners and losers, guilt and innocence. 180 The
171 U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5, art. 4 (emphasis added).
172 OAS Draft Declaration, supra note 6.
173 See S. 1691, 105th Cong. (1998) (sponsored by Senator Slade Gorton and
abolishing tribal immunity from suit and making Indian tribal governments sub-
ject to judicial review). See also El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 485 (stating
that "[wie are at a loss to think of any reason that Congress would have favored
tribal exhaustion").
174 U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5, at Preamble.
175 See Albert A. Hale, Lessons in Sovereignty for All, INDIA CoUNTRY TODAY,
July 28, 1998, available at 1998 WL 18037722 (in which Mr. Hale states that "[wie
understand our sovereignty is upheld or diminished by the manner in which our
courts resolve disputes. For that reason, we must give priority to protect and sup-
port our legal system.").
176 OAS Draft Declaration, supra note 6, at Preamble.
177 See Hurst Hannum, Sovereignty and Its Relevance to Native Americans in
the Twenty-First Century, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 487, 488 (1998/1999).
178 See Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society, 79
JUDICATURE 126 (1995).
179 See id. at 126.
180 See id.
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indigenous justice paradigm, however, is based on a holistic phi-
losophy guided by unwritten customary laws, traditions, and
practices whereby the victim is the focal point and the goal is to
heal the victim's physical, emotional, and spiritual well-being
while at the same time restoring community harmony.18 ' An-
other difference between Anglo-American and indigenous sys-
tems is that the former relies on a separation of church and
state, while the latter invokes spirituality and the cleansing of
one's soul. 182
The Navajo Nation represents a good example of an indige-
nous population that has a dual system of justice.'8 3 The
Courts of the Navajo Nation were created in 1959 and reconsti-
tuted in 1985.184 These Courts were modeled after the state ad-
versarial system and, in many ways, reflect Anglo-American
law and procedures. 8 5 In addition, there also exist traditional
Navajo law and custom.'8 6
Traditional Navajo tort law is based on "nalyeeh," which is
a demand by a victim to be made whole for an injury.8 7 In
"nalyeeh," one who is hurt is not concerned with intent, causa-
tion, fault, or negligence."' Rather, a restorative justice is in-
voked in which the focus is on compensation, which will restore
good relations to the members of the community. 8 9 In deter-
mining compensation, the victim's feelings and the perpetra-
tor's ability to pay are more important than damages
determined by using a precise measure of losses.' 90 This con-
trasts the Anglo-American adjudication process, which is preoc-
181 See id. at 127.
182 See id.
183 See The Honorable Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes From It". Navajo Justice
Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175, 186 (1994).
184 See id.
185 See id. Some argue that indigenous groups like the Navajo were forced to
adopt such systems in order to gain respect from state and federal judiciary. See
B.J. Jones, Tribal Courts: Protectors of the Native Paradigm of Justice, 10 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 87, 91 (1997). The Neztsosie case was in this court system and
subject to the Navajo rules of civil procedure that were modeled aftr and reflect
Anglo-American procedures.
186 See The Honorable Robert Yazzie, supra note 183.
198 Id. at 184.
188 See id.
189 See id. at 185.
190 See id.
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cupied with the "truth" and strives to make one party the villain
and the other party the victim. 191
The differences between Anglo-American law and tradi-
tional Navajo law are a reflection of the cultures from which
they are created. Although each purports to achieve justice, the
type of justice and means by which it is sought can be quite
different. Such differences may also show why both the U.N.
Draft Declaration and OAS Draft Declaration recognize the im-
portance of independent indigenous legal systems. More is at
stake, however, than mere legal differences. Cultural factors
may also affect the outcome of a case that is taken from the
tribal court and adjudicated in federal court.
In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,192 the lawsuit in-
volved injuries allegedly sustained from ingestion of toxic and
radioactive chemicals. 193 According to the plaintiffs, El Paso
operated open-pit uranium mines within the Navajo Nation in
the 1950's and 1960's, and upon cessation of mining activities,
the mines were left open and eventually collected large quanti-
ties of water.194 The water in the open pits subsequently be-
came polluted with radioactive materials and a host of other
toxic materials.'95 In the early 1970s, the Neztsosies used the
water "for drinking, bathing, swimming, clothes laundering and
stock watering."' 96 As a result, the Neztsosie children suffered
from severe neurological disorders, which came to be known as
"Navajo Neuropathy."1 97
The injuries sustained by the Neztsosies and the circum-
stances from which they arose reflect unique characteristics of a
Navajo way of life and culture. A nomadic practice, which in-
volves sustenance from water collected in open pit mines, may
not represent a culture with which most Anglo-Americans could
readily identify. There is room for concern about whether a fed-
191 See id. at 178.
192 El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 473.
193 Id. at 477.
194 See Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,
526 U.S. 473 (1999), available at 1999 WL 14509 at JA *19a (U.S. Resp. Brief,
Joint Appendix).
195 See id. at *19a, *23a, *24a.
196 See id. at *19a, *23a.
197 Respondent's Brief, supra note 155, at 11, n.13 (citing Snyder et al., Infan-
tile Onset and Late Central White Matter Lesions in Navajo Neuropathy, 24 ANN.
NEUROL. 327 (1988)).
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eral court and jury could identify with and understand the no-
madic existence and cultural ways that took the Neztsosies to
the watering holes in the first place. In addition, through the
course of litigation, it would not be surprising if other aspects of
Navajo culture, including traditional customs involving
medicine and healing were examined and if a jury was asked to
evaluate mitigating or contributing circumstances. If members
of a federal jury have never been a part of the Navajo culture
and have no knowledge of Navajo medicine and spiritual heal-
ing, then how can they be expected to fairly evaluate such
factors?
One can only wonder if the cultural and legal differences
will affect the outcome of the Neztsosie's case as well as other
cases that may arise in the future. But whether or not justice is
served, the Neztsosies will not get it from the Courts of the Nav-
ajo Nation. 198 Instead, the Neztsosies must trust a federal
court and jury to judge their practices, sacred ceremonies, cus-
toms, and traditions, and hope that some day the declarations
of indigenous people will be heard in Washington.
IV. CONCLUSION
The growing movement in international law to recognize
and protect the rights of indigenous peoples has culminated in
two declarations of change: the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to the Commission on Human
Rights1 99 and the American Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples.200 Both Declarations contain specific statements
regarding the right of indigenous peoples to enjoy legal and ju-
dicial independence from the State. Although neither declara-
tion has been fully adopted by member states, each represents
the aspirations of indigenous groups throughout the world.20 '
In the United States, the policy of tribal sovereignty, em-
bodied in the tribal-exhaustion rule, appears to harmonize well
198 See generally El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, No. CIV 96-49-PCT-
RGS (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2000) (on remand from the Supreme Court and 9 th Circuit
Court of Appeals, order granting permanent injunction against suit in Navajo tri-
bal court).
199 See generally U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 5.
200 See generally OAS Draft Declaration, supra note 6.
201 See Hannum, supra note 177, at 493.
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with the OAS and U.N. Draft Declarations regarding legal inde-
pendence. Even this limited reservation of sovereignty, how-
ever, has not been sustained by the Supreme Court in recent
decisions. 202 Rather, the Supreme Court has charted a course
in Strate v. A-1 Contractors20 3 and in El Paso Natural Gas Co. v.
Neztsosie20 4 which is "neither constitutionally authorized nor
constitutionally limited;"20 5 a course which is even less legiti-
mate in light of the growing international movement respecting
indigenous rights.
202 See generally Strate, 520 U.S. at 438; Burlington N. R. R. Co., 522 U.S. at
801; El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 473.
203 Strate, 520 U.S. at 438.
204 El Paso Natural Gas Co., 526 U.S. at 473.
205 Pommersheim, supra note 76, at 462.
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